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Wage Setting in Modern Labor Markets: 
Neither Fair Nor Efficient 
 
The increasing wage inequality in many countries is usually seen as brought about by 
economic forces that drive for economic efficiency within a changing technological and social 
environment. Ethical evaluations of these developments diverge, yet the view that free labor 
markets drive to efficiency remains undisputed. 
This note sets out to criticize, in a non-technical manner, this efficiency presumption which is 
based on Adam Smith’s theory of wage setting. It is urged that a Smithian wage structure 
would indeed be both efficient and fair. Yet modern labor markets work in ways that are 
fundamentally different to what was envisaged by Adam Smith. That makes the outcomes 
observed in modern labor markets, according to Smithian standards, both inefficient and 
unfair. As a consequence, the pursuit of the Smithian ideal requires organizational remedies, 
intervention and regulation in labor markets. 
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 Increasing wage inequality can be observed in many countries. This is often
seen as the result of economic forces that drive for economic efﬁciency within
a changing technological and social environment. Ethical evaluations of such
developments diverge, though. Some, like Robert Nozick, see all free-market
processes and, by implication, all outcomes brought about in free labor markets,
as inherently moral. Others, like Paul Krugman, insist that the market economy
is just a system for organizing activity, without any special moral signiﬁcance.1
Yet the view that free labor markets drive to an efﬁcient allocation of labor
remains undisputed. In the following note this latter paradigm is critically
examined in a non-technical manner, and rejected.
The efﬁciency presumption is based on a theory of wage setting that has
been outlined by Adam Smith.2 A Smithian wage structure would indeed
be both efﬁcient and fair. Yet modern labor markets work in ways that are
fundamentally different to what was envisaged by Adam Smith. That makes the
outcomes observed in modern labor markets, according to Smithian standards,
both inefﬁcient and unfair. As a consequence, the pursuit of the Smithian ideal
requires organizational remedies, intervention and regulation in labor markets.
Modern labor markets generate much greater inequality between wages than
would be demanded by efﬁciency considerations, which is neither economically
justiﬁed nor morally acceptable. It is imperative that such aberrations are
corrected, at least in part, through appropriate measures in regulatory and tax
policy. In this way, both the productive capacity of the economy and fairness
and social harmony can be advanced at the same time.
Compensating wage differentials
To begin with, let us examine Adam Smith’s theory of wage setting in more
detail. Smith interpreted disparities in wages in essence as “compensating
wage differentials.” This term refers to a state in which jobs that are more
unpleasant than others are also better paid. A wage differential compensates
these disadvantages. Such compensation is necessary in order to obtain the
1 Nozick (1977), Krugman (2010)
2 Smith (1904, Book I, Chapter 10)
2necessary quantity of labor (workers) in all cleared markets. Otherwise, no
one would be willing to carry out disagreeable jobs. Likewise, jobs for which
a great deal of prior knowledge is necessary must offer earnings which make
it worthwhile to acquire this prior knowledge. Wages are thus generated in a
free labor market according to Smith in such a way that there are for every
employment always enough willing employees who are largely indifferent
between this and another job.
If wages are determined according to the principle of compensating differ-
entials, the level of wages can be very different between different jobs. But if
one takes all advantages and disadvantages of the individual jobs into account,
the discrepancies in remuneration will, according to Adam Smith, broadly com-
pensate these various boons and drawbacks.3 The differing wage levels serve to
balance out the beneﬁts and hardships of different jobs and in this sense are also
fair.
The ensuing differences in wages due to compensating differentials are not
only individually equitable but, furthermore, they are economically justiﬁed
because they correctly reﬂect all aspects behind individual labor output. They
ensure, for instance, that a job involving considerable noise exposure must be
paid a premium which is high enough to offset the harm, as compared to a
similar yet quieter job. Correspondingly, this job is more expensive for the
ﬁrms. The greater discomfort will consequentially be expressed in the product
prices. The same applies for jobs that require a high degree of qualiﬁcation.
Products that require higher-paid work are more expensive than products that
require lower paid work. This is desirable from an economic perspective, as such
prices reﬂect social scarcities correctly. The wage structure that results from
compensating wage differential according to Smith is thus efﬁcient and fair. We
share this view to this day. The question is: does modern wage setting follow
the principle of compensating wage differentials?
3 Smith (1904, i.10.42)
3Productivity and low wages
First, let us make one observation that is especially important for the current
discussion: the wages described by Smith are in the long term not based on
the “productivity” of the workers. Rather, the “productivity” of the workers
is a market outcome and is determined by the wages which, in their turn, are
formed based on the principle of compensating differentials.
The consideration is that ﬁrms will continue to hire additional labor as
long as their productive contribution surpasses the wage. If this is the case
for a ﬁrm, it will expand its employment and production. The price will fall
and the value of the products of this work will become less. The productivity
of the corresponding workers, measured by the value added, will decline. In
this manner the workers become less productive. Conversely, the curtailing of
unproﬁtable production leads to higher prices of the corresponding products, by
which the corresponding work becomes more productive – without the effort of
the workers having changed in the slightest. The “productivity” of a worker is
thus not a characteristic of the person but a market outcome stemming from the
wage of the worker.
This adjustment of the prices to the wages is a result of competition and
is independent of the way by which wages are set – whether they are formed
by the principle of compensating differentials or not. Over the last ten years,
an extensive low wage sector has been created in Germany and some other
countries. This led to lowered prices of the associated products and therefore to
lower “productivity” of the people employed there. The economic consequence
of such measures is prices that are generated in an economically undesired way,
because similar labor is paid differently, and product prices cannot reﬂect social
scarcities correctly. The wage differential between high earners and low earners
is now explicitly not compensating and the Smithian wage setting principle is
violated. Such wages are neither efﬁcient nor fair.
4Modern wage setting
The very existence of a low wage sector – in which workers receive a lower
remuneration than similar workers in regular employment – serves to show
that wage setting in this type of labor market takes place in a fundamentally
different manner than Adam Smith had imagined it. In fact it is characteristic
for modern labor markets that principles aside from compensating differentials
are decisive for wage setting. This will be brieﬂy established in the following.
The Smithian explanation that wage structures are formed in a free market
based on the principle of compensating differentials rests on two arguments.
First, ﬁrms must offer wages which at least compensate the additional burden,
or effort, or training requirements of particular jobs. Second, there is no mo-
tive for ﬁrms to offer wages above what is necessary in order to attract labor.
Compensating differentials are sufﬁcient to do this.
The ﬁrst argument still applies today. The wage differentials must corre-
spond at least to the compensating differentials if one wishes (in the context of
universally cleared markets) to ﬁnd applicants. The problem is in the second
argument, because there can be reasons for ﬁrms to offer wage differentials
which exceed the compensating differentials. Exactly this is typical of modern
labor markets and leads to high disparities in wages.
One common example can illustrate the fact that modern labor markets work
differently than the simple pattern of supply and demand would suggest. This
is the tendency for several qualiﬁed applicants to apply for one open position,
of which the best candidate is hired. For open positions there is thus typically
an excess supply of labor. Firms accordingly pay more than they would need
to in order to attract candidates and ﬁll the position, and do not reduce their
wage offer to the point that only one candidate is left and in this sense market
clearing is reached. It is not important in this context that ﬁrms in this situation
complain of a scarcity of “qualiﬁed” applicants. This is the case in every state of
the labor market, because ﬁrms will always set the hiring standards as high as
possible.
Why is it that ﬁrms offer wages that exceed the compensating differentials
if they could acquire labor with less money? The theoretical backing is that
ﬁrms react to changes in the state of the labor market both with wage and labor
5grading adjustments and with adjustments in the qualiﬁcation demands. (I have
used the term “Reder competition” for this.4) For every job, employees with
the same formal qualiﬁcation will always differ in their performance. The ﬁrms
compete in their wage setting for the particularly capable employees, so that the
ﬁrm that pays better wages will on average acquire more efﬁcient workers. It
is with this consideration that ﬁrms set their wages. If one ﬁrm pays too little,
it will not be able to maintain its best employees and must be satisﬁed with
more average applicants. The competitors for the especially able employees and
applicants are now the other ﬁrms. To some extent, the ﬁrms attempt to outbid
each others’ wage offers in their rivalry for the top workers. Such competition
leads to a much higher degree of wage divergence than would be expected for
compensating wage differentials.
This type of ﬁrm behavior and the accompanying lack of market clearing are
well known.5 It is often seen as a market imperfection, which would not arise
in a “truly free” market. In this context it is common to talk of institutionally
created “wage rigidity”, which constrains the wage setting possibilities of ﬁrms.
Yet this manner of speaking is highly misleading, because ﬁrms choose this
remuneration policy themselves. It therefore has nothing to do with constraints
to competition. Furthermore, wage setting is altogether not at all rigid, but
rather ﬂexible in some dimensions. Cyclical wage movements are, for example,
more pronounced than price movements over the business cycle. Thus, wages
do change with economic circumstances, but wage setting does not, as Smith
imagined it, serve the purpose of market clearing. “Flexibility” does not mean
“ﬂexibility in the right direction”. Wages react ﬂexibly but – measured against
the hypothetical ideal of market clearing – they react “wrongly”. This should
not to be equated with “rigidity”.
Every ﬁrm sets its wage level such that the costs and beneﬁts of a change in
wages exactly balance out. This method of wage setting is carried out relative to
the wage setting of the other ﬁrms, and largely independently of the principles
of market clearing. This process leads, as measured against the Smithian ideal,
4 Schlicht (2007). With Reder competition, wages exceed reservation wages. This occurs in free
labor markets, while Adam Smith would presumably have argued that such an aberration from











Figure 1: D9/D1: The ratio of high to low wages (90th percentile to 10th percentile) in vari-
ous countries in 2007 (gross wages of full-time employees, countries denoted by license plate
abbreviations, data from the OECD.)
to more pronounced wage inequality. Insofar as compensating wage differentials
characterize the desirable – because efﬁcient and fair – wage structure, divergent
wage structures are unfair and inefﬁcient.
The empirics
Independently of the question of why ﬁrms offer wages that exceed compensat-
ing differentials, we can inspect the empirical facts to ﬁnd out whether ﬁrms in
fact do this. If wage setting were to take place as Adam Smith imagined it, then
the wage structures and wage inequality in countries which are organized on
similarly industrial lines would have to be comparable, as the advantages and
disadvantages of analogous jobs would large coincide.
Figure 1 illustrates wage inequality in various OECD countries on the basis
of the D9/D1 ratio. This ratio reﬂects the relationship between high and low
7wages in one country: one observes the frequency distribution of the wages and
takes the wage level under which 90% of all other wages lie. This is the 9th
decile (D9), or the 90th percentile. Only 10% of wages are higher. This value is
compared with the wage level under which only 10% of wages lie. This is the
1st decile (D1), or the 10th percentile. The measure D9/D1 therefore sheds light
on wage inequality. From the ﬁgure, one sees that the wages in the US in the 9th
decile are nearly ﬁve-fold higher than wages in the 1st decile. In Germany, Japan,
the Netherlands and France this ratio is about 3:1, while in Norway and Sweden
it is only slightly above 2:1. The wage inequality in comparable economies is
thus vastly different.
The principle of compensating differentials refers to net wages, i.e. wages
after taxes. Were wages determined by this principle, then the inequality in
net wages would have to be similar across countries. The gross wages would
have to display more inequality in the Scandinavian countries, as a result of
the higher tax progression, than in countries with less progressive tax systems,
such as the US. Yet the opposite is true. This also speaks against wages being
formed by compensating differentials. (However, this type of relationship
between higher taxation and less dispersion is to be expected when companies
with high wage offers compete for as large a selection of capable workers as
possible). Overall, the data in Figure 1 are thus a strong indication that wage
differentials in many countries are not compensating differentials. Further, the
data indicate that countries with competitive labor markets (like the US) exhibit
more inequality than countries with more regulated labor markets (like the
Scandinavian countries). This contradicts Adam Smith’s view about the levelling
effect of free competition on wages.
A further indicator for a divergence of reality from the Smithian ideal is the
steadily rising wage inequality, for example in Germany. Figure 2 illustrates
this development for the years 1985 to 2007. For workers in the upper salary
classes, the real wage has risen by 30% in this period, while for members of the
lower salary classes it has in fact declined by 1%!
In order to derive such a dramatic divergence in wages from the develop-
ment of compensating wage differentials, one would have to argue that over
time the disadvantages in highly paid jobs had risen dramatically or that the
advantages of poorly paid jobs had improved yet further. Yet a change of this













Figure 2: Development of real wage income of male regular employees subject to social insurance
in West Germany from 1985 to 2007, relative to 1985: lower wage area (15th percentile), middle
wage area (50th percentile) and upper wage area (85th percentile). Source: IAB Nuremberg.
magnitude seems highly implausible. Moreover, it has been shown that the level
of overqualiﬁcation has increased in all segments of the labor market: more and
more workers are not employed in tasks appropriate to their level of training
or – considered from another angle – there is more qualiﬁcation than would be
required to clear the market.6 This, too, contradicts the assumption that wage
differences in modern labor markets arise due to compensating differentials, as
would be demanded out of both efﬁciency and fairness considerations.
6 Vaisey (2006)
9Economic policy implications
The thesis of this article necessarily begs the question of which economic policy
measures can be taken in order to counteract the observed aberrations in wage
setting.
We have noted already that realized wage differences exceed compensating
wage differentials to an especially high degree, and are especially inefﬁcient and
unfair in countries with few labor market restrictions (like the United States).
Following Adam Smith’s advice to remove all restrictions seems to increase
inequality, rather than decrease it, and render the labor market less efﬁcient. Yet
there are other options for enhancing both efﬁciency and fairness.
One possibility lies in the strengthening of collective wage setting mecha-
nisms. Collective agreements have a leveling effect, presumably because they
accentuate fairness aspects across companies to a greater extent than agreements
at the company level.7 Because fairness and efﬁciency aspects point in the same
direction here, this also allows society to achieve improvements.
A further possibility to curtail wage inequality toward a more efﬁcient
and fair level is to increase the progressivity of taxation. This makes it less
proﬁtable for ﬁrms to challenge each other with higher wage offers for the
especially productive employees, because each wage increase is partially taxed
away and thus less effective. This curbs wage inequality. We have seen that the
Scandinavian countries, with their highly progressive tax systems, belong to the
economies with the lowest wage inequality.
The full range of possibilities and intricacies to reduce wage inequality
cannot be presented here. The positive consequences for employment resulting
from a reduction in wage inequality would also be worthy of discussion in this
context. First, however, it is of urgently required to consider wage setting in
modern labor markets afresh. Modern wage setting does not have the efﬁciency
characteristics which Smith in his time ascribed to free labor markets and which
are repeatedly assumed as fact in the public discussion.
Independently of the economic considerations, it should not be forgotten
that the problem of fairness in wage setting strikes at the foundations of our
7 Gerlach and Stephan (2006), Freeman (1998, 7)
10society. More equality in a society is accompanied by better physical and
mental health, better education and better living standards, particularly for
children. Meanwhile, increasing inequality is correlated with an increase in
drug abuse, violence and criminality.8 All of these additional considerations are
extraordinarily important. The economically appropriate measures also serve
these higher goals. It is thus essential for the well being of our society to do
what is economically commanded and socially required.
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